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Abstract
Recently, Boyer et al. presented a novel semiquantum key distribution protocol [M. Boyer, D.
Kenigsberg, and T. Mor, Phys. Rev. Lett. 99, 140501 (2007)], by using four quantum states,
each of which is randomly prepared by Z basis or X basis. Here we present a semiquantum key
distribution protocol by using entangled states in which quantum Alice shares a secret key with
classical Bob. We also show the protocol is secure against eavesdropping.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most promising applications of quantum infor-
mation science. The goal of QKD is to allow two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, to generate
a secret key over a long distance, in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, who interferes with
the signals. The security of QKD is based on the fundamental laws of physics. Since the BB84
protocol[1], the first QKD scheme, was published, many variations on QKD have been subse-
quently proposed. They can be roughly classified into “prepare and measure” protocols, such
as BB84, B92[2], the three-state protocol[3], the six-state protocol[4] and “entanglement based”
protocols, such as E91[5], BBM92[6]. There have been efforts made to set a security proof based
on entanglement for the both classes[7].
QKD protocols claim that both the parties are quantum. That is to say, both parties should
perform quantum operation on their qubits. Boyer et al. considered a new problem that in the
QKD protocol if one party is quantum and the other has only classical capabilities, whether the
protocol could achieve to distribute a key between the parties securely. They then presented a
novel semiquantum key distribution protocol[8] (hereafter called BKM07 protocol), in which
one party (Alice) is quantum and the other (Bob) is classical, and proved that the protocol is
completely robust against an eavesdropping attempt. Similar to BB84, in their protocol, Alice
prepares a random qubit in the computational (Z) basis {|0〉,|1〉} or Hadamard (X) basis {|+〉,|−〉}
and sends it to Bob. They call the computational basis classical and use the classical notion {0,1}
to describe the two quantum states {|0〉,|1〉}. Bob can access a segment of the quantum channel,
but he is restricted to performing some classical operations. Different from BB84, he can only
measure the transmission qubits in the classical {0,1} basis, prepare a qubit in the classical basis
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and send it, reflect it to Alice directly or reorder the qubits (for example, by using different delay
lines). As Bob can only deal with qubits in the classical basis, he is regarded as a classical party.
To ensure the security of BKM07 protocol, the communication parties should keep Eve from
knowing which is a particle that Bob measured in the computational basis and which is a particle
that Bob reflected to Alice directly. Actually, BKM07 protocol is similar to BB84 protocol if we
regard Bob as the initiator in BKM07 protocol. Bob selects randomly either to measure the re-
ceiving qubit and resend it or reflect it directly, which looks like Bob prepares randomly the four
quantum states {|0〉,|1〉,|+〉,|−〉}. Boyer et al. showed a different semiquantum key distribution
protocol[9] based on randomization (hereafter called BGKM09-Randomization-based protocol).
Different from BKM07 protocol, Bob can reorder the particles besides measuring and prepar-
ing a qubit in the classical basis in BGKM09-Randomization-based protocol. In order to avoid
Eve’s acquiring Bob’s operation information on each receiving qubit, Bob reorders randomly the
reflected qubits. Furthermore, they proved the robustness of the protocol in much more general
scenario. Zou et al. presented five different semiquantum key distribution protocols[10] in which
Alice sends three quantum states, two quantum states and one quantum state, respectively. Li
et al. proposed two semiquantum secret sharing protocols[11] by using maximally entangled
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states in which quantum Alice shares a secret with two classical
parties, Bob and Charlie.
In this Letter, we present a semiquantum key distribution protocol by using entangled states.
We follow the descriptions about classical in Ref.[8]. Quantum Alice can prepare two-particle
entangled states and measure the particles in Bell basis or computational basis. Classical Bob
is restricted to measuring, preparing, reordering, or sending quantum states only in the fixed or-
thogonal quantum basis set {|0〉,|1〉}. We show that Eve’s eavesdropping would inevitably disturb
the transmission quantum states and the communication parties could detect Eve’s attack.
2. Description of the protocol
We then describe the semiquantum key distribution protocol using entangled states in de-
tail. Suppose Alice wants to share a secret key with classical Bob. The protocol comprises the
following steps.
(1) Alice prepares N Bell states, each of which is in the state
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉)AB, (1)
where A, B represent the two particles of each state. Alice takes one particle from each state to
form an ordered partner particle sequence [B1, B2, · · · , BN], called B particle sequence. She then
send the N particles [B1, B2, · · · , BN] to Bob.
(2) For each particle arriving, Bob selects randomly either to measure it in the computational
basis (SIFT it) or to reflect it to Alice directly (CTRL it). Bob reorders randomly the N parti-
cles and generates a rearranged particle sequence [B′1, B′2, · · · , B′N], called B′ particle sequence.
He then sends B′ particle sequence to Alice. The order of the rearranged particle sequence is
completely secret to others but Bob himself, which ensures the security of the present scheme.
(3) Alice stores the receiving particles in quantum memory and informs Bob that she has re-
ceived the N particles. Bob publishes which particles he chose to CTRL and the secret rearranged
order of the particle sequence.
(4) For each of the CTRL particles (those were reflected directly), Alice performs Bell basis
measurement on the reflected particle B and particle A she owned. If there is no eavesdropping,
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Alice’s measurement result should be |φ+〉. Alice analyzes the error rate on the CTRL particles
according to her measurement results. If the error rate is higher than the threshold they preset,
they abort the protocol. We call this step the first eavesdropping check.
(5) For each of the SIFT particles (those were measured in the computational basis), Alice
performs Z basis measurement on particle A and particle B. She chooses randomly a sufficiently
large subset from the measurement results for eavesdropping check. She announces which are
the chosen particles. Bob then publishes his measurement results. Alice checks the error rate
and if it is below the threshold they preset, they proceed to execute the next step. Otherwise they
abort the protocol. We call this step the second eavesdropping check.
(6) Alice announces error correction code (ECC) and privacy amplification (PA) data. Alice
and Bob utilize the ECC and PA to extract the final key.
Obviously, the protocol can also be realized by using some other entangled states, such as
|φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)AB , |ψ+〉 = 1√2 (|01〉 + |10〉)AB and |ψ
−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)AB. Similar to
BKM07 protocol, Bob can make use of a different sifting method called measure-resend at step
(2). We only need to modify step (2)-(3) of the previous protocol. The modified steps are as
follows:
(2’) For each particle arriving, Bob selects randomly either to measure it in the computational
basis and resend it to Alice after measurement (SIFT it) or to reflect it to Alice directly (CTRL
it).
(3’) Alice stores the receiving particles in quantum memory and informs Bob that she has
received the N particles. Bob publishes which particles he chose to SIFT and which particles he
reflected directly to Alice.
We call the modified protocol measure-resend protocol. In the measure-resend protocol, Bob
only needs to perform computational basis measurement on the particles and reflect the particles
directly.
3. The security for the protocol
The key of the security of the protocol is to keep Eve from knowing which particles are
CTRL particles and which ones are SIFT particles. If Eve can distinguish CTRL and SIFT
particles properly, she can easily achieve the secret key by performing computational basis mea-
surements on the SIFT particles. At step (2) of the protocol, Bob reorders the particles so that
no one could distinguish CTRL and SIFT particles properly except Bob. However, Eve can
distinguish Bob’s operation properly with a certain probability in the measure-resend protocol.
Of course, Eve’s eavesdropping will be detected by communication parties during the second
eavesdropping check. Suppose Eve intercepts particle B at step (1) and prepares a Bell state
|φ+〉EE′ = 1√2 (|00〉 + |11〉)EE′ . She sends particle E
′ to Bob instead of particle B and keeps parti-
cle E. She reflects particle B directly to Alice without disturbing it. According to step (2’), Bob
chooses randomly either to SIFT it or to CTRL it. If Bob chooses to SIFT, |φ+〉EE′ will collapse
to |00〉EE′ = 1√2 (|φ
+〉 + |φ−〉)EE′ or |11〉EE′ = 1√2 (|φ
+〉 − |φ−〉)EE′ each with probability of 1/2. If
Bob chooses to CTRL, |φ+〉EE′ keeps unchanged. After Bob sending particle E′ to Alice, Eve
intercepts particle E′ and performs Bell basis measurement on particle E and E′. If she obtains
|φ−〉, she can ascertain that Bob has chosen to SIFT. If Bob chooses to SIFT or CTRL each with
probability of 1/2, Eve can acquire his operation information properly with probability of 1/4.
The communication parties cannot detect the exist of Eve during the first eavesdropping check.
However, Eve’s attack cannot escape from the second eavesdropping check. We’d best not let
3
Eve have a chance of distinguishing CTRL and SIFT particles properly. For the protocol using
order rearrangement, this trick of Eve’s will inevitably fail.
According to Stinespring dilation theorem[12], the attack of an eavesdropper Eve can be
realized by a unitary operation ˆE on a large Hilbert space, HAB ⊗ HE . Then the state of Alice,
Bob and Eve is
|Φ〉 =
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
|εa,b〉|a〉|b〉, (2)
where |ε〉 denotes Eve’s probe state. |a〉 and |b〉 are states shared by Alice and Bob. The condition
on the states of Eve’s probe is
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
〈εa,b| εa,b〉 = 1. (3)
We can describe Eve’s attack on the system as
ˆE|0, ε〉 = α|0, ε00〉 + β|1, ε01〉, (4)
ˆE|1, ε〉 = β′|0, ε10〉 + α′|1, ε11〉, (5)
where |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, β′|2 + |α′|2| = 1. Eve can eavesdrop particle B at step (1) and the state of
composite system will be
|Φ〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉A(α|0, ε00〉 + β|1, ε01〉)BE + |1〉A(β′|0, ε10〉 + α′|1, ε11〉)BE]
=
1√
2
[α|0, 0, ε00〉 + β|0, 1, ε01〉 + β′|1, 0, ε10〉 + α′|1, 1, ε11〉]ABE
=
1√
2
[(α|0, ε00〉 + β′|1, ε10〉)AE |0〉B + (β|0, ε01〉 + α′|1, ε11〉)AE |1〉B].
(6)
If Bob chooses to SIFT, |Φ〉 will collapse to (α|0, ε00〉+β′|1, ε10〉)AE |0〉B or (β|0, ε01〉+α′|1, ε11〉)AE |1〉B
each with probability of 1/2. In the course of the communication parties’ checking the errors on
the SIFT particles at step (5), the error rate introduced by Eve is e = |β|2 = |β′|2 = 1 − |α|2 =
1− |α′|2. If Bob chooses to CTRL, particle B will be reflected directly. Eve can intercept particle
B again and perform another unitary operation ˆE′ on |Φ〉, the state of the system becomes
|Φ′〉 = 1√
2
[γ|0, 0, ε′00〉 + δ|0, 1, ε′01〉 + δ′|1, 0, ε′10〉 + γ′|1, 1, ε′11〉]ABE
=
1
2 [γ(|φ
+〉 + |φ−〉)AB|ε′00〉E + δ(|ψ+〉 + |ψ−〉)AB|ε′01〉E
+ δ′(|ψ+〉 − |ψ−〉)AB|ε′10〉E + γ′(|φ+〉 − |φ−〉)AB|ε′11〉]E . (7)
When the communication parties check the errors on the CTRL particles at step (4), the error
rate introduced by Eve is e = 1− (|γ|2+ |γ′|2)/4. If Eve attempts to obtain information, she would
inevitably induce some errors that legitimate parties could notice.
To explain the error rate introduced by Eve, we take an example for individual attack strategy.
Suppose Eve intercepts the particles in B particle sequence transmitted to Bob at step (1) and
4
makes measurements on them. She then resends particles to Bob according to her measurement
results. In this way, if Eve measures particle B in the Z basis, |φ+〉 will collapse to |00〉AB or
|11〉AB. If Eve’s result is |0〉 (|1〉), she sends a particle in the state |0〉 (|1〉) to Bob. According to
the protocol, Bob chooses randomly either to SIFT it or to CTRL it and reorders the particles.
Because |00〉 = 1√
2
(|φ+〉 + |φ−〉) (|11〉 = 1√
2
(|φ+〉 − |φ−〉)), during the first eavesdropping check,
Alice performs Bell basis measurement on particle A and B, and obtains |φ+〉 or |φ−〉 each with
probability of 1/2. Thus the error rate introduced by Eve is 50%. Suppose Eve intercepts particle
B at step (1) and uses it and her own ancillary particle in the state |0〉 to do a CNOT operation
(particle B is the controller, Eve’s ancillary particle is the target). Eve then resends particle B
to Bob. The state of particle A, B and Eve’s ancillary particle becomes 1√
2
(|000〉 + |111〉)ABE .
At step (2), Bob selects randomly either to SIFT or to CTRL and reorders the particles. In view
of 1√
2
(|000〉 + |111〉)ABE = 12 [(|φ+〉 + |φ−〉)|0〉 + (|φ+〉 − |φ−〉)|1〉], Alice obtains |φ+〉 or |φ−〉 each
with probability of 1/2 at step (4). Thus the error rate introduced by Eve will reach 50% and her
eavesdropping will be detected.
4. Conclusion
So far we have proposed a semiquantum key distribution protocol by using entangled states
and analyzed the security for the present protocol. In the protocol, quantum Alice can share a
secret key with classical Bob. Bob is restricted to measuring a particle in the classical basis,
preparing a particle in the classical basis, reflecting a particle directly, or reordering the particles.
Bob utilizes order rearrangement to keep Eve from distinguishing which particles Bob chose
to CTRL and which particles he chose to SIFT. The communication parties make use of twice
eavesdropping checks to ensure the security of the protocol. Since the users only need to perform
some classical operations on particles, semiquantum key distribution can be realized at a low cost.
It also provides a good idea for building quantum key distribution network (For example, we can
build a Key Distribution Center which is quantum, but the users have only classical capabilities).
There are many difficulties to be dealt with when implementing semiquantum key distribution in
the practical scenario. We would like to explore these problems in future.
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